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COMPETITION AS JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOY-
PLOYMENT OF FELLOW WORKMAN.
That, in the absence of justification, it is actionable to induce
an employer by a strike or a threatened strike to discharge or refuse
to employ a workman, has been repeatedly held. But notwith-
standing many such cases in recent years presenting the question
as to within what limits a strike, involving no acts tortious per se,
may be justified by labor as legitimate competition, the boundary
lines remain unmarked. In a large and increasing proportion of
these cases the presence or absence of justification must depend
upon the object of conduct.
The question. has recently arisen in Pennsylvania in the case
of Erdman v. Mitchell, 56 Atl. 334, which was an action by one
labor union against another to enjoin the latter from attempting by
strikes or threatened strikes to prevent members of the former from
securing or continuing in employment because of their refusal to
join the latter union. An injunction was granted on the ground
that a strike which has for its purpose the infliction of direct and
immediate injury or damage to another for the possible accomplish-
ment of some indirect and remote benefit is unjustifiable. The
decision is in accord with the well established rule in Massachusetts,
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Id. 92,
where an unbroken line of authorities reiterates the doctrine that
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the presence or absence of malice may be controlling in this class
of cases. In the latter State the courts have gone further and held
that, regardless of whether the employment be for a specified length
of time or at will, to maliciously and without justifiable cause induce
an employer to discharge a workman, "whether the inducement
be false slanders or successful persuasion, is an actionable tort."
Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485.
In Vegelahn v. Guntner, supra, Holmes, J., dissents on the
ground that, the conflict between employer and employed being
competition, the unity of organization sought is necessary to make
the contest of labor effectual, and hence a strike which has for its
object the strengthening of the union is justifiable; in such a case
malice is not present. The contention is not without authority to
support it.
In a case somewhat similar to Erdman v. Mitchell and Plant
v. Woods, supra, the New York courts have upheld as legitimate
competition the right of a labor union to deprive members of another
union of employment. It is said by the court of appeals that where
the action of a labor union is based upon proper motives a strike
may be justifiable, and that to secure an exclusive preference of
employment to its members on their own terms and conditions,
provided that no force is employed and no unlawful act is committed.
is a proper motive. National Protective Association v. Gumming,
53 App. Div. 227; affirmed by a divided court in 17o N. Y. 315. In
its decision the appellate division relied upon the case of Allen v.
Flood (1898), A. C. i. But Allen v. Flood has subsequently been
carefully ilmited and explained, Quinn v. Leathen (I9oi), A. C.
495, and even in England can now hardly be said to be applicable
to this class of cases. Giblan. v. National Amalgamated Laborers'
Union, C. A. (19o3) 2 K. B. 6oo. Moreover, the case of National
Protective Association v. Cumming, supra, cannot well be recon-
ciled with Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, representing the earlier
line of decisions in that State, and dicta in recent cases would seem
to indicate the probability of future modification of this rule.
The foregoing cases are easily to be distinguished from that
class in which strikes have been held justifiable which had for
their object the maintenance of a scale of wages; Reynolds v. Everett,
144 N. Y. 189; the limiting and regulation of the employment of
apprentices; Longshore P. & P. Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527; or
were the result of -a refusal to admit competitors to membership or
to work with such competitors; Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters'
Association, 47 N. J. Eq. 519. Here, the object of the competitor
has been his immediate financial gain, and although competition
has resulted in the intentional infliction of damage by interference
with another's business, it is held justifiable upon considerations
of public policy. Upon this point the decisions of the courts are
in practical accord; beyond it they are conflicting.
The case of The London Guar. & Accident Co., Ltd., v. Horn,
decided last December by the Supreme Court of Illinois, although
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not involving the strike element, is instructive. The court held that
an employee whose discharge was procured by a company which
had guaranteed the employer against loss by injury done to its
employees, because of his refusal to accept a small sum in settlement
of such a loss, was entitled to recover for his dismissal. The gain
ensuing to the company from the reduction of damages payable was
distinguished from that secured where the purpose was success in
competition, and was held to be a justification of the action taken.
It is obvious that no definite rule can be formulated by which
to test the presence or absence of justification in every case. Only
a very rough classification is possible, and each case must be largely
controlled by its own peculiar facts and circumstances.
MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEMS-ARE THEY PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROPERTY
OF THE CITY?
Does a municipal corporation owning its water system hold the
property in its public or private capacity? It was recently decided
in Rochester and Lake Ontario Water Co. v. Rochester, 176 N. Y.
i66, that after a municipality had constructed a costly water system
under legislative permission it was competent for the legislature
to pass a subsequent act authorizing a corporation organized under
it to lay pipes through the streets of any city lying between the
source of supply and the town to be furnished with water. In thus
passing through the city of Rochester the company proposed to
come into direct competition with the municipal water system,
taking away some of the latter's most valuable customers and sub-
stantially decreasing its revenues. In the opinion of the three dis-
senting judges the city should have exclusive control of its water
system because, inter alia, "to subject this system to competition
or interference would be to weaken or destroy it"; the inference
being that the system was the private property of the city in which
it had acquired vested rights. "A city or other political division,"
say the dissentient judges, "acts in a dual capacity. In business
matters it is treated as a private person."
Whether or not municipal water works are held as the private
or public property of the city is a subject upon which the courts
disagree. An earlier case in New York takes the ground that
property owned and used by the city to supply its inhabitants with
water belongs to it in its private right. In Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill
531, 539, Nelson, J., said: "The powers conferred by the legislature
authorizing this great work are not, strictly and legally speaking,
conferred for the benefit of the public. The grant is a special
private franchise, made as well for the private emolument and ad-
vantage of the city as for the public good. The State in its sovereign
capacity has no interest in it. It owns no part of the work. The
whole investment under the law and the revenue and profits derived
therefrom are the private property of the city as much as the lands
and houses belonging to it situate within its corporate limits."
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This theory is held in other States, notably Pennsylvania, Michi-
gan, Ohio and Rhode Island, and there are analagous expressions
in the adjudications of England and Massachusetts. On the other
hand, the doctrine that such property belongs to the city in its public
rather than its private capacity has been asserted in the United
States Supreme Court, in Delaware, North Carolina, Connecticut,
and by Judge Denio of New York, who denied altogether the duality
theory of the public and private rights and liabilities of municipal
corporations. Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y. 204.
In Western Saving Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175, at
p. 183, this language is used: "But the contracts which a municipal
-corporation may make for the purpose of supplying its inhabitants
with gas relate to the 'things of commerce' as distinguished in the
civil law from the 'things public' which are regulated by the sov-
ereign. Such contracts are not made by a municipal corporation by
virtue of its powers of local sovereignty, but in its capacity of a
private corporation. The supply of gas light is no more a duty of
sovereignty than the supply of water. The whole investment is the
private property of the city." Also Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa.
St. 338; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 18o.
In the City of Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165, 184, it was said:
"The sewers of the city, like its works for supplying it with water,
are the private property of the city-they belong to the city. The
corporation and its corporator, the citizens, are alone interested in
them-the outside public or people of the State at large have no
interest in them as they have in the streets of the city which are
public highway." Vide Judge Cooley in Board v. Detroit, 28 Mich.
228; Cooley, Const. Lint., 253; Cooley, Taxation, 482. The pre-
ceding excerpt is quoted and adopted in the Ohio Supreme Court.
Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336, 367, 368. To same effect,
Aldrich v. Tripp, ii R. I. 141, 146; Esterg-Gunst Co. v. Portland.
34 Oregon 282; Scott v. Manchester, 2 H. & N. 204.
The reasons deducible from the foregoing decisions why such
property should be regarded as private rather than public appear to
resolve themselves into two forms. First, such ownership involves
in no sense a governmental duty. It is a matter of purely local
concern of no interest whatever to people in the State at large.
Second, to render the city liable in tort for negligence or other
wrongdoing in connection with such ownership it is necessary to
regard the property as private. It has been repeatedly held that
a city cannot escape liability by setting up the defence that its
water works are public property over which it is exercising public
functions.
The reason for the contrary view-that the ownership is a
public one-is found in the theory that if such property were private
it might become subject to execution on the part of the city's
creditors. "Indeed, it would be attended with the most serious
consequences and involve the greatest amount of inconvenience to
lay it down as a rule that any property belonging to a municipal
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corporation, not actually used in the discharge of its public functions
could be levied upon and sold under ordinary execution, as upon a
judgment against a private corporation." Darling v. Baltimore, 15
Md. i, 14. And this case, too, regarded the furnishing of water
and gas by a municipal water or gas company as "not essentially
a public municipal function." Vide the recent case of Brocken-
brough v. Charlotte, 46 S. E. 28 (N. C.). Other courts have gone
a step further and denied that municipal corporations had any strictly
private capacities. Darlington v. Mayor, supra. In New Orleans v.
Morris, 105 U. S. 602, 603, the court said, "the city was not situated
as regards this property as a private person would be in the purchase
and acquisition of ordinary property." So also in Connecticut such
water works must "unquestionably now be regarded as an under-
taking for the public good, in the judicial sense of the term, not
indeed as the discharge of one of the few governmental duties
imposed upon it [the city of Hartford], but as ranking next in
order." West Hartford v. Commissioners, 44 Conn. 36o.
It is submitted, the better opinion seems to be that such property
is public and not private. It is paid for by taxation and there
can be taxation for no other but a public purpose. Cooley, Const.
Lim., 5th ed. pp. 209, 621. Moreover, municipal property is par-
ticularly subject to legislative control when purchased with funds
raised by taxation. Darlington v. Mayor, supra; Corn. v. Lucas,
93 U. S. 114; Cooley, Const. Lirn., 5th ed., p. 292-295., The
inhabitants of the city do not have rights in such property in any
way analagous to that possessed in their individual property. The
proposition is well expressed in Coyle v. McIntire, 7 Houst. (Del.)
44, at page 94: "The uses for which the corporation may acquire
and hold property must necessarily, we think, be public uses. No
citizen of Wilmington possesses any interest in the property la
municipal water works], which is said to be private, which he can
sell or in any manner dispose of. 'No portion of the property held
by the city passes to the local representatives of any inhabitant of
the city or descends to his heirs after his death; partition cannot
be made of the realty among the inhabitants in any manner known
to law. Such property has not the incidents of private property
attaching to property recognized as private among individual owners
of property. When a citizen removes from the city he ceases to
have any interest in the use of the property as a corporator."
THE VALIDITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS.
By a constitutional amendment the city and county governments
of Denver and Arapahoe county have been consolidated. Article
XIX of the Colorado constitution provides, among other things,
that "the general assembly shall have no power to propose amend-
ments to more than six articles of the constitution at the same
session." It is admitted that the amendment, styled article XX,
proposed, and ratified properly by the people, affects more than
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six articles of the constitution. The supreme court of the State
in People v. Sours, 74 Pac. 167, has supported the amendment.
Provisions for amendment are to be carefully observed, that the
strength and dignity of the instrument itself may not be impaired.
The constitution is the organic law of the State, and, speaking in
the abstract, it is upon- the unchangeableness of this law that the
people rely. The "amendment habit" is a recognized weakness,
but this, as an argument, is not to be urged farther than to temper
the right of the people to alter their constitution as their needs
demand. The judiciary may, to a considerable extent, guard
against the evil. Th.is question of discretion came up some years
ago in Switzerland, where government institutions are similar to
our own. The Salvationists undertook an "invasion" of the land.
In some of the cantons their "campaigns" excited disturbances, and
local laws were passed for the suppression of the meetings. The
Salvationists declared the laws unconstitutional. The question was
brought to the executive, as the highest tribunal, on a plea to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. He issued a report or judgment,
based partly on law and partly on general considerations of public
policy, granting the plaintiffs the right to hold meetings, but adding
that the right must be exercised with moderation.1 Bound as our
decisions are by rules .and precedent, peculiar circumstances may
call for the discretion of the court.
The language of article XIX of the Colorado constitution was
undoubtedly taken from the constitution of Illinois. It is a natural
circumstance that the decisions most nearly in point should appear
in the reports of the latter State. Taking up the matter that
amendments by necessary implication do not offend the provisions
of the constitution, the court, in Wabash Ry. v. Drainage and Levee
District, 194 Ill. 310, said: "Section 31 of article IV of the con-
stitution of 187° as amended, under which the statute authorizing
the appellee district to become incorporated was enacted, is para-
mount to the constitutional limitations in the constitution as origin-
ally framed with which it is in conflict." To the same effect are
Moore's Executors v. Lewis, io6 Ill. 376; Huston v. Clark, 112 id.
344;Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 133 id. 446. The rulings in Quick
v. Township, 7 Ind. 57o, and Railroad Co. v. Rambolt, 67 Tex. 654,
to the effect that where two provisions of a written constitution are
irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in
local position is to be preferred, are relevant to show the con-
sideration due an amendment. In the latter case it was said,
touching more directly the matter in hand, that if the last provision
was more comprehensive and specific, it should be given effect on
that ground. See also People v. Angle, 1O9 N. Y. 564. A con-
stitution is the intention of the people, Federalist, No. 78, and a
later intention is to be given the greater consideration. One of
Madison's letters recites: "I think myself, that it will be expedient,
'The Nation, Dec. 15, igo.
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in the first place, to lay the foundation of the new system in such a
ratification of the people themselves of the several States, as will
render it clearly paramount to their authority." The sovereign
right of the people to abolish or amend their constitution is exer-
cised less often in this than in foreign countries of similar govern-
ment. When this right is exercised a fair and liberal construction
should be given the act and an amendment sustained unless in clear
violation of the provisions of the constitution. The court has so
held, and in accord with principles which a century of popular
government has shown to be correct.
